Summary
The recent proliferation of private well irrigation systems, especially in South Asia, has stimulated groundwater transactions through bilateral bargaining between owners and non-owners over multiple types of contracts, including output sharing contracts. The existence of a bargaining structure implies that the price of groundwater, or equity, varies across pairs of sellers and buyers depending on the particular characteristics that determine their relative bargaining positions. The existence of output sharing contracts implies, as is widely held in contract theory literature, that a disincentive akin to the effect of ad valorem tax can render production inefficient and also that payment of high rent can render income distribution inequitable. Thus far, however, emerging empirical studies on groundwater markets have either been village level cost-benefit analyses or case studies. These have paid little attention to the particular characteristics of sellers and buyers, such as their bargaining positions or types of groundwater contracts.
The purpose of this paper is to enrich our understanding of the nature of groundwater markets by examining the impact on efficiency and equity of both bargaining relationships and output sharing contracts using household data from Madhya Pradesh in India. The efficiency is examined using two methods: a conventional method which compares input intensities under different contractual statuses including output sharing water contracts, and also by the stochastic production frontier model. We examine equity by comparing groundwater prices under output sharing contracts with prices under other types of contracts. In order to capture the impact of bargaining positions, we include as the determinants of price the characteristics of both water sellers and buyers.
Regression results find no significant inefficiency on the farms managed by buyers under output sharing contracts, presumably because the possible disincentive effect is circumvented through effective monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms embedded in long-term and intensive personal relationships between sellers and buyers.
The results also find that output sharing buyers pay higher water prices, presumably due to the inclusion of a risk premium and an implicit interest premium. However, the rate of premiums (39%) is not excessively higher than the informal interest rate (34%) that the sharing buyers would have had to bear under other types of contracts. The results also show that the buyers who have alternative water sellers pay lower water prices.
These findings indicate that taking into account the imperfection of credit and contingent markets in rural areas, informal groundwater markets would work fairly well in agrarian communities if monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms are Efficiency and equity in groundwater markets: the case of Madhya Pradesh, India
Introduction
International attention to water resources in developing countries has been increasing (e.g. the series of World Water Forums), and with this increasing attention has come the realization that with water, as with other resources, efficiency, equity, and sustainability of use depend greatly on the institutions at play (Easter et al., 1998; Bjornlund and McKay, 2002) . However, though it is growing, the fund of knowledge on water use institutions in developing countries is still limited.
Recent proliferation of private well irrigation systems, especially in South Asia, has stimulated groundwater transactions involving bilateral bargaining between owners and non-owners over multiple types of contracts, including output sharing contracts.
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The existence of a bargaining structure implies that price, or equity, of groundwater varies across pairs of sellers and buyers depending on the particular characteristics that determine their relative bargaining positions. The existence of output sharing contracts implies -, as is widely held in contract theory literature -that a disincentive effect akin to that of ad valorem taxation can render production inefficient and, furthermore, 1 Estimates are that about 20 percent of well owners are involved in water trading in India and Pakistan (NESPAK, 1991; Saleth, 1998) .
that high rent payment can render income distribution inequitable (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993) . Thus far, however, previous and emerging empirical studies on groundwater markets are either village level cost-benefit analyses or case studies. These have paid little attention to the particular characteristics of the buyers and sellers, such as their bargaining positions or the types of contracts (Pant, 1991; Shah, 1993; Fujita and Hossain, 1995; Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Saleth, 1998) .
The purpose of this paper is to expand our understanding on the nature of groundwater markets by examining the impacts of bargaining relationships and of output sharing contracts on efficiency and equity, using household data from Madhya Pradesh in India. The efficiency of groundwater markets is examined by the stochastic production frontier model as well as by a conventional method which compares input intensities under different contractual statuses, including output sharing water contracts.
Recently Ahmed et al. (2002) applied the frontier model to the examination of inefficiency under different land tenancy contracts in Ethiopia; we attempt to do the same for groundwater markets in India.
Equity is examined by comparing groundwater prices under output sharing contracts with prices under other types of contracts. We specifically examine whether the excess price paid under output sharing is larger than the additional benefits achieved under this contract but not under the other types of contracts. To capture the impact of bargaining positions we include the characteristics of both water sellers and buyers as determinants of price. We can do this because our data set identifies who sells to whom, and thus our analyses are unlikely to suffer from the omitted variable problems of empirical studies based on data from either sellers or buyers, alone.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2, offers a theoretical discussion on groundwater markets in the context of contract theory.
Section 3 identifies the structure of groundwater markets in the study area. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, present the empirical results on efficiency and equity. Finally, a summary and concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
The groundwater market in the context of contract theory
In the literature on contract theory, there are two competing views regarding the impact on efficiency of output sharing contracts (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993) . The traditional approach treats the shared payment to resource owners (e.g. landlords, water sellers, etc.) as if they were ad valorem taxes on resource users (e.g. tenants, water buyers, etc.). Hence, when the user makes input decisions he is equating only a fraction of the marginal value product with the marginal cost, implying that resources are being used inefficiently. This allocative inefficiency is known as Marshallian inefficiency. The other approach, Cheung's view (1969) , is that if the resource owner can monitor the user and enforce optimal resource allocation, the resource will be used efficiently, as the owner wishes. Thus, whether production is efficient or not will depend on the cost of monitoring and contract enforcement. Institutionally, where intense social interactions and long-term personal relationships provide mechanisms for monitoring and adhering to the contract, the outcome obtained is likely to be efficient (Bardhan, 1984; Otsuka et al, 1986) .
The availability of a range of contractual forms also matters for efficiency.
From a global survey of empirical evidence as well as from their own case studies, Hayami and Otsuka (1993) conclude that "significant inefficiency in share tenancy is not commonly found in areas where both share and fixed-rent contracts are available:
inefficiency tends to arise where the contract choice is institutionally restricted" (p. 174).
The rationale underlying this is that rural people make efficient choices when choices are available. Summarizing the implications regarding efficiency: farmers can choose output sharing contracts without suffering significant loss of efficiency if monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms work and if the output sharing contract is not institutionally restricted.
With regard to equity, the contract theory literature argues that share contracts can be inequitable due to high rent payment (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993) . If the production risk is transferred from user to owner by means of an output sharing contract, a risk premium can be transferred from the former to the latter in the form of higher resource use fees. In addition, since an output sharing tenant pays post-production whereas a fixed-rent tenant pays pre-production, an implicit interest premium can be included in the fees. Under imperfect insurance and credit markets, these premiums may be regarded as legitimate transfers. Hence, equity is examined by measuring how much the excess price paid under output sharing is higher than these premiums.
Another argument regarding equity relates to the effect of bargaining relationships. Land rental markets in many developing areas are characterized by a limited number of landlords and a large number of landless cultivators, where the assumption is that land rents are set by landlords at a level such that landless cultivators receive only their reservation wage or utility exogenously determined in the labor market. Thus, the principal-agent model is commonly used in the land tenancy literature. However, in groundwater markets, as shown in the following section, a more reasonable assumption is that a relatively small number of buyers and sellers negotiate groundwater prices. Hence, we incorporate the feature of bargaining model in our empirical framework of equity analysis.
3.
The structure of groundwater markets in the study area
The six villages investigated in this study are located in two adjacent districts (Hoshangabard and Narshingpur) in Madhya Pradesh, India. These villages were randomly selected from villages with groundwater transactions. The field survey was conducted from December 1997 to April 1998. The villages are homogeneous in terms of agronomic conditions, characterized by monsoon rain and deep-black soil.
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The farmers in the area cultivate soybeans during the rainy season (Kharif) without relying on irrigation, while they cultivate mostly wheat and sometimes chickpeas during the dry season (Rabi) with irrigation.
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The dominant means of irrigation in the study area are private-well systems consisting of electric pumps, wells, and water conveyance networks such as ditches and pipes. water-selling owners in our study area. No owner in our study area is a buyer of groundwater.
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All the water buyers are non-owners and all buy from a single seller, not from several. On the contrary, some owners sell water to more than one buyer, and thus the number of buyers is larger than that of sellers -79 buyers were identified.
Because the number of sellers and buyers is relatively small, we did not sample them but instead tried to interview them all. Ultimately, we interviewed 36 sellers and 50 buyers, accounting for 50 water transactions among them.
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Our questions centered on their irrigation and wheat cultivation activities during the dry season.
Our household survey shows that the total cost of pumps and well digging 4 In other parts of India, well owners who have multiple plots in different places buy water for their unirrigated plots from those who have wells nearby (Shah, 1993) .
5 It was not feasible to meet with all of them within the limited survey period. One reason for this is that we interviewed sellers and buyers separately to avoid biases in their answers that might be created by the social relationships between them. Another reason is that in some cases the head of household was unavailable.
ranges from Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 50,000 when the local agricultural labor wage is about Rs.
40 and that most of the owner-sellers (66%) borrowed money from commercial banks to finance their irrigation investment. Land is the most important collateral in the rural credit market and the buyers' landholdings are smaller than those of the sellers' in our sample (4.7 ha and 12.7 ha on average respectively), thus we can presume that inaccessibility of credit is one of the barriers preventing non-owners from purchasing their own irrigation systems. No water right exists for groundwater so there are no major institutional obstacles, other than credit availability, to digging wells on one's own land.
One of the options for a non-owners in need of irrigation is to use the groundwater market. There seems to be no social restrictions against entering into that market. Shah (1993) concludes from available field surveys that no discrimination exists in sales or in the quality of service on the basis of caste, political affiliation, economic or social status or even social/family relationship. This is consistent with our survey which shows that more than 60 % of water transactions occur between groups from different castes. Access to groundwater markets is affected, however, by physical constraints that limit the delivery area, such as topography or the length of water conveyance facility required. Therefore, the number of potential buyers any one owner can expect is also physically limited, as is the number of potential sellers that a non-owner can expect. For these reasons, one characteristic of groundwater markets is that they are places where water transactions are negotiated through bilateral bargaining between an owner and a nearby non-owner with little impact from their social relationship.
Three types of contracts can be observed in the study area: fixed charge per season, flat charge per application of water, and output sharing contracts. Under a fixed charge contract, water buyers pay a fixed amount of cash once per season for a specified irrigation acreage for the entire season. Under a flat charge contract, a buyer irrigates as much as he wants at a given price per acre and pays each time he applies the water. By contrast, under an output sharing contract, the buyer pays for the water for a dry season crop by providing a certain portion of their product after the harvest of that crop. The output sharing rate varies from one-quarter to one-half, sufficiently large that the possibility of Marshallian inefficiency in groundwater markets cannot be ignored.
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Fixed charge, flat charge, and output sharing contracts account for 40%, 22% and 38% of the total contracts, respectively.
Some important remarks on the features of the contracts in our study area are 6 The share in other regions varies from one-third in Andra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu to one-half to two-thirds in Gujarat (Saleth, 1998). relevant here: Firstly, all the water buyers cultivate self-owned plots; no case is found in our sample wherein a landlord provides water to a tenant as part of an interlinked land tenancy contract. Similarly, we find no interlinked input transaction, where the buyer provides labor in return for water. These facts indicate that contracts entered into are strictly for the groundwater and that the agreed price captures the full charge.
Secondly, unlike land tenancy markets which are often under legislative control, such as land reform laws, there are no formal restrictions in the groundwater market to the range of contractual forms. Lastly, no informal restrictions exist in the choice of contract form in our study area.
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From these observations, we conclude that the transaction pair -buyer and seller -choose an optimum contract solely for groundwater transaction from a wide spectrum of available contract formats.
The choice of contract type is related to the individual characteristics of the farmers. Using this same data set, Kajisa (1999) has shown that output sharing 7 Besides these three types of contracts, Shah (1993) observes several different types in Andra Pradesh, India. One is the labor contract, under which the buyer provides labor and draft power to his seller in return for water. Another is the crop and input sharing contract, under which the seller provides water and shares the buyer's input costs and harvest (interlinked contract). Fujita and Hossain (1995) observe a contract called "chaunia" in Bangladesh, under which a well-owner rents land during the dry season from a landlord who does not own irrigation systems. We observed no such contracts as those noted by Shah. We found only one case in our study area resembling a "chaunia" contract, which we excluded from our sample as an exceptional case. In our household survey, we confirmed that there was neither formal nor informal restriction against such contracts.
contracts are more likely to be chosen when water sellers possess animals -are less risk-averse -and when they are educated -have risk management ability. The conclusion from this is that the behavior of farmers in groundwater markets is consistent with the literature on contact choice (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993) , that the transferability from buyer to seller of production risk through an output sharing contract depends on the attitudes of the farmers toward risk and on the degree of risk. One important implication of this is that risk sharing is an important motivation in the use of output sharing contracts. Another important implication for the purposes of this study is that the type of contract will not be changed in the short-run because wealth and educational level, which are two significant determinants of contract choice in the study area, do not change in the short-run, either. In the long-run, contract type may be flexible, but in the short-run it will be quasi-fixed so that optimization strategies are carried out through adjustments to other variables. Hence, hereafter in our analysis we treat type of contract as a quasi-fixed variable.
Given the structure of groundwater markets depicted above, what implications can we draw in terms of efficiency and equity? The structure indicates that efficiency conditions are likely to be satisfied. Firstly, a wide spectrum of contract choice is available. Secondly, since well owners irrigate their own plots and sell water to nearby non-owners, there is no seller corresponding to an absentee landlord, rarely interacting with his tenants and having only weak social ties to the villagers. Groundwater sellers and buyers interact directly and can closely observe each other. Thirdly, unlike share tenants, who in most cases do not own land and may easily migrate out their villages, both the sellers and buyers of water in our study area cultivate plots which they, themselves, own. Thus they tend to remain in their villages, creating and maintaining long-term personal relationships. Because of these conditions, we expect efficient production in groundwater markets even under output sharing contracts.
As for equity, the existence of risk premium and implicit interest premium in the price of output sharing contract is suggested. Also suggested is the bargaining relationship between sellers and buyers. To incorporate the bargaining feature, proxies for the bargaining powers of both sellers and buyers must be included, and our matched data set allows this. Accordingly, in estimating water price function, we include not only an output sharing dummy in order to capture risk premium and implicit interest payments, but also bargaining power variables in order to capture price variations that reflect bargaining positions between buyers and sellers. 
4.
The efficiency of agricultural production under output sharing contracts
The Conventional Approach
Conventionally the existence of Marshallian/allocative inefficiency is examined by testing whether farmers under output sharing contracts use inputs less intensively than farmers under other contract forms or than owner-farmers (Bell, 1977; Shaban, 1987; Acharya and Ekelund, 1998) . The input intensities in our empirical analyses are measured by man-days of labor input per acre and by fertilizer amount per acre. Note that man-days of labor input is not an accurate measure of true labor input, for which quality of labor, or the labor effort, is also important. This is not readily observable and so will require more careful treatment, which we give it in next subsection.
We use a sample of 66 households consisting of 25 sellers and 41 buyers that have complete production records. Using the sellers' self-irrigated production activities as the base of comparison, we examine whether the buyers' input intensities under each type of contract statistically differ from those of the sellers.
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For this frequency of water application. Since we cannot postulate the equivalency of fixed and flat charge contracts a priori, in our empirical study, we include separate dummies for the fixed and flat charge contracts, in addition to the dummy for output sharing contracts.
9 Although owners-cum-non-sellers are not included in the base group, this exclusion would not be inappropriate for efficiency analyses. Owners-cum-sellers are assumed to be the most efficient farmers because they usually sell water only after completing irrigation of their own plots. Thus, they cultivate purpose, we introduce dummies for each type of buyers -output share, fixed charge, and flat charge farmers -while assigning the seller as the base category. To control for the effects of differences in household characteristics, age and schooling of household heads are included as proxies for farming experience and farming ability, respectively. To control for land quality, the estimated value of plot per acre (i.e. plot price) is used.
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Lastly, village dummies are used to control for village level agronomic and socio economic differences. The summary of descriptive statistics is reported in Table 2 .
The results of the OLS estimation in Table 3 show that no contractual status dummies are significant for either dependent variable, indicating that the intensities of measurable input do not differ significantly among the four types of farmers.
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The fact that the land quality variable has significant coefficients in both regressions indicates that farmers use non-land inputs more intensively at fertile plots because the with sufficient irrigation, whereas some owners-cum-non-sellers might suffer water shortages. Hence, as the benchmark, we use the owner-cum-sellers' production.
10 Shaban (1987) and Acharya and Ekelund (1998) controlled household characteristics by comparing different types of contracts within the same household or by comparing owned land and land under output sharing contracts cultivated by the same household. As our data set does not have such a structure, we control for them by including observable plot and household specific characteristics.
11 Since the number of observations under each contract type is small, we combined two or three dummies (e.g. combining fixed and flat charge or combining all three dummies) and ran OLS regression with fewer dummies. No significant inefficiency is detected even under these settings.
marginal products of these inputs are higher.
These results seem to support the validity of the efficiency thesis under monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms. However, Marshallian inefficiency might still exist in an unobservable labor effort that cannot be detected accurately by the conventional comparison approach.
Stochastic Production Frontier Approach
Labor effort may be undersupplied under output sharing contracts due to the disincentive effect inherent in that kind of contract. If that is the case, there will be a gap between the observed man-days and the actual labor effort applied; in other words, at a given level of man-days, the output of output sharing buyers will be lower than that of other farmers who devote the same man-days with full effort. Thus, the degree of inefficiency due to an undersupply of labor effort can be measured by the vertical distance between the production level realized by output sharing buyers at the observed level of man-days and the production frontier at the same level of man-days with full effort. This comparison may provide an appropriate measure of the output gap, but it is still incomplete because the observed output will include stochastic errors. Without distinguishing stochastic errors, the estimated production function will be biased, and so will the level of predicted inefficiency.
The stochastic production frontier model is an econometric model designed to measure the level of inefficiency for individual observations without disturbance from the error term (Kalirajan, 1990; Coelli, et al, 1998) . Battese and Coelli (1995) developed the model that estimates the level of individual inefficiency and its determinants simultaneously, thus circumventing the omitted variable problems which arise when the estimations are done separately.
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We apply the stochastic production frontier model to India's groundwater markets, as Ahmed et al. (2002) have done to Ethiopia's land tenancy markets.
Assuming Cobb-Douglas production function, the model may be expressed as:
where area is the irrigated area for wheat cultivation, fertilizer is the amount of chemical fertilizer, labor is the observed labor input measured by man-days, v is random measurement errors assumed to be iid N(0, σ v 2 ) and independent of the u which is a 12 The two-step procedure estimates the production function using only input variables; then, using the determinants of inefficiency, it explains the inefficiency predicted from the production function. This method suffers from omitted variable problems due to the omission of the determinants of inefficiency at the first stage estimation of the production function.
non-negative random variable with N(m i , σ u 2 ) distribution.
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The inefficiency due to the labor effort gap is captured in u i . The vector z i is the determinant of inefficiency including contractual status. One shortcoming of this model for our purposes is that u captures inefficiency from all possible causes, such as quality differences in labor and land, not only that stemming from an undersupply of labor effort. To control for this, we include the explanatory variables used in our conventional approach. The summary descriptive statistics of output and input variables are reported in the lower part of Table 2 .
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation are shown in Table 4 . The estimated γ is 0.805 (close to one) and significant at the 1% level, indicating that the vast majority of residual variation is due to the inefficiency effect, u, and that the random error term, v, is very small.
Equity under Output Sharing Contracts
The issue of equity can be addressed by examining whether the buyers under output sharing contracts pay significantly higher water prices than those under fixed charge or flat charge contracts even after controlling for other factors. We use a sample of 50 water transactions conducted between 36 sellers and 50 buyers. The dependent variable is the unit water price in wheat equivalence, defined as the ex-post total payment for water divided by area irrigated and by the number of water applications.
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The explanatory variables used to represent the characteristics of seller and buyer households are age and schooling years of the head of household.
Characteristics of the irrigation technology of the seller also may influence the price level. One characteristic is represented by total investment in irrigation systems, comprised of the total investment costs of well digging, electric pumps, pipelines, and sprinkler systems. This variable attempts to measure the capacity of irrigation systems, 15 An hourly basis is the prevalent measurement unit when cost varies directly with hours of pumping, in areas where people use diesel pumps or electric pumps with pro rata power cost. An acreage basis is used otherwise -for the ease of the seller in keeping records of buyers' pump usage (Shah, 1993; Saleth, 1998) . The farmers in our study area, as is common in areas irrigated by electric pumps with free or fixed power cost, use acreage based water rates. such as horsepower and water command area determined by the available conveyance facilities. Another characteristic is the sum of operational costs per acre, comprised of the cost of electricity, cost of repairs and necessary parts, and wages for pump operations, if any.
Bargaining powers matter in groundwater markets in that a party with transaction alternatives may be in a position to coerce a partner by threatening to withdraw from the contract. A dummy for the existence of buyer alternatives is used to capture seller bargaining power. Buyer bargaining power is captured by the dummy for the existence of seller alternatives in the event that supply is denied by the current seller. We also introduce a dummy variable representing caste commonality of buyer and seller to see how closeness affects the bargaining over price. We use village dummies to control for village fixed effects.
Finally, we introduce two dummies for fixed and flat charge contracts to determine whether prices are higher under output sharing contracts. As discussed in Section 3, type of contract used may persist for some period once a particular form has been chosen. Under this circumstance, the system becomes a recursive one, at least in the short-run; thus we can use the sharecrop dummy as a predetermined exogenous variable in our water price function. Nevertheless, we cannot deny the simultaneity of their decision process, and thus we run regressions with the dummies to compare with the models without the dummies. The descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized in Table 5 .
The regression results are reported in Table 6 . The results of Model 1 show that two dummies are both negative and significant, implying that the groundwater price under output sharing contracts is significantly higher. 16 The null hypothesis that the coefficients of fixed charge and flat charge dummies have the same magnitude is not rejected by the F test (see the lower portion of the table), implying that the difference between these two types of contract is not observed in a difference in price level.
Hence, they are combined to create a new dummy variable named non-share dummy, the results are reported as Model 2. Model 2 indicates that the water buyers under output sharing contracts pay higher water prices to the sellers by about 14 kg of wheat above buyers under the other forms of contracts.
The results in Model 3, which does not include contractual dummies, show that a few coefficients change their magnitudes across the models, indicating that the 16 One may be concerned that the output sharing buyers' payments became high simply because the survey year happened to be a good harvest year. However, the village interview revealed that the survey year was considered to be a year of normal weather. In all villages, the average yields over the sample households fall within the ranges of normal year averages given in the village level interview: some villages were close to the upper boundary and some were close to the lower one. We expect that the share buyers' payments in the survey year were not materially larger than those in other normal years. possibility still exists of simultaneous decision making. However, based on the highly significant results in Models 1 and 2, it is still reasonable to focus on the possibility of a transfer of profit from output sharing buyers to sellers.
There are two explanations for the high water price paid by output sharing buyers: a risk premium payment and an implicit interest payment. The coefficients of the contractual dummies indicate that the share buyers pay about 14 kg of wheat above what other buyers pay. The mean water price of non-output-sharing buyers is 36 kg of wheat, meaning that the implicit premium rate borne by the output sharing buyer is 39% for 6 months of dry season. In most cases in our study area, the informal interest rate for farming purposes is 5% per month, equivalent to 34% for a season.
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Taking into account the imperfection of both insurance and credit markets in rural villages, the premium rate of 39% may be acceptable if it is considered to be the sum of risk premium and implicit interest.
Another interesting result is that the bargaining power of the seller (dummy of alternative buyers) is insignificant in price determination, whereas that of the buyer (dummy of alternative sellers) significantly reduces the water price. This result is 17 The informal interest rate ranges from 3% to 5% per month in our study area. In most cases, the interest rates lower than 5% are applied to non-farming expenditures such as marriage and medical treatment.
consistent with the typical situation in groundwater markets -sellers can sell water to multiple buyers but buyers usually buy water from only one seller, per plot. Generally sellers irrigate their own plots first using their own irrigation systems, after that the systems are idle. Hence, from the seller's point of view, once he finishes irrigating his own plot, it is to his advantage to sell the water to as many buyers as possible, as long as he can recover costs. The buyer knows this, and will be skeptical of any threat by the seller to withdraw from the transaction. In fact it is the buyer who is more likely to be in a position to threaten the seller because if the buyer should decide to buy water from another seller, the current seller will be unable to supply him. Because the owners of irrigation systems are conventionally referred to as "water-lords", there is a perceptive that their pricing practices may be exploitative. Our results imply that this conventional view is not necessarily correct; rather that buyers with access to alternative sellers are in a strong position.
This strength of position requires that there actually be potential alternative sellers; therefore, in those villages where there are a sufficient number of sellers, the groundwater price need not be high -a circumstance rather easily achieved. Shah (1993) points out that although early operations in the water business may be motivated by a desire to establish a monopoly position, it is difficult to hinder others from entering this market as new sellers. In addition, farmers who become well owners will want to sell water to as many buyers as possible when their own plots have been irrigated and their systems fall idle (Shah, 1993) . For such reasons, the number of potential sellers is likely to be large and the price of groundwater will not be high.
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In addition to the impacts of contracts and bargaining relationships, we find several interesting features. The first is that water charges in Village F are higher than those of other villages, reflecting a scarcity of water (see low irrigation percentage in Table 1 ). The second interesting point is the relationship between educational level and groundwater price. According to Table 6 , the coefficient of seller education is significant, although the effect is small (i.e. 1.6-1.7 kg of wheat for one additional year of education). One possible explanation is that the seller's educational level may capture his social status, which may be associated with his bargaining power.
Nevertheless, as the impact of education is relatively small, equity in the groundwater market is unlikely to be greatly affected by the seller's educational level.
A third point relates to irrigation technology variables. The coefficient of total investment is not significant, implying that groundwater price does not differ between expensive (i.e. effective) and less expensive (i.e. less effective) irrigation systems. The 18 The level of the water table and topography may affect the distribution of wells to counter the effect of this situation. coefficient of the sum of operational costs is not significant either. Since fixed electricity costs and repair costs, which constitute the largest part of operational costs, are incurred by the seller regardless of the amount of groundwater used by the buyer, the marginal cost is close to nil, resulting in the insignificant coefficient.
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The groundwater price in our study area, where the marginal cost is negligible, is set with the intention of charging implicit risk and interest premiums to output sharing buyers and also of enjoying some bargaining premium over buyers who have no alternative seller.
Concluding remarks
This paper examines efficiency and equity in groundwater markets with special attention to output sharing contracts and to the bargaining relationships between buyers and sellers. A sample of water buyers and sellers in six villages in Madhya Pradesh, India is used for empirical analysis. Three major findings are drawn from the results of our regression analyses: First, significant inefficiency is not found on farms managed by the buyers under output sharing contracts, presumably because potential disincentive effects are circumvented through effective monitoring and contract 19 The electric power for agricultural use is free in villages from A to C. A fixed amount is charged if a pump exceeds five horsepower in the villages from D to F. adherence mechanisms embedded in long-term and intensive personal relationships between sellers and buyers. Second, output sharing buyers pay higher water prices to sellers than do farmers under other types of contracts, presumably due to the inclusion of risk and implicit interest premiums. Nevertheless, the rate of premiums shouldered by the output sharing buyers (39%) is not excessively higher than the informal interest rate (34%) that they would have to carry under the other types of contracts. Therefore, we may regard the premiums the sellers receive from output sharing buyers as an inevitable transfer, given the imperfection of credit and contingent markets in developing countries. Third, in addition to the impact of output sharing contracts, we also find that the water price becomes lower when alternative water sellers are located nearby.
These findings suggest that taking into account the imperfection of credit and contingent markets in rural areas, informal groundwater markets will work well if effective monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms are embedded and if a sufficient number of potential sellers exist. Furthermore, our field observations and the literature indicate that this situation is likely to be achieved in the groundwater markets. Bjornlund and McKay (2002) , in their review of literature on Indian and Pakistani groundwater markets, conclude that informal groundwater markets may safely be relied on while the establishment of formal institutions and legal frameworks takes place. Our empirical findings support their conclusion.
There are some remarks worth mentioning for future research. First, our results imply that as the number of potential sellers increases, the groundwater prices could become lower than the social marginal cost if the government maintains its current agricultural policies, wherein electricity is fee or at fixed fee and the private marginal cost of pumping is almost nil. This would lead to overuse of groundwater beyond a socially optimal level. The existence of a significant gap between private and social optimums in the informal groundwater market in India and how agricultural policies should be altered are subjects to be addressed in future research. Second, although the premiums paid by output sharing buyers may be considered inevitable transfers in rural areas, they can be significantly reduced if credit and insurance markets are more fully developed. Policies reducing production risk would also help eliminate the risk premium payment or even the sharecrop contract itself. These suggestions, also, should be fully examined in future research. This is the sample of 50 water transactions conducted between 36 sellers and 50 buyers.
a Numbers shown are proportions of samples * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level.
